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FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN CANADA AND 




Despite the increasing tendency to relegate religion to the private sphere, 
the role of religion in public debate remains important and contested. 
Given the reality that these debates usually results in binding decisions 
that must be accepted by all groups, this paper engages the idea that 
perhaps the goal in a pluralistic society should not be to simply garner 
unanimous agreement or even the greatest consensus possible, but 
to ensure that decisions be seen by all members of a society as valid, 
whether or not they accord with individual or collective views.  
Arendt’s theory of judgment holds that it is the use of the ‘enlarged 
mentality’, the consideration of others’ perspectives, that allows 
judgment to be seen as valid by the judging subjects. Nedelsky, in turn, 
focuses on how this approach to judgment helps us theorize about the 
optimal role of religiously based argument in the public space. This 
paper  examines  what  Nedelsky’s  theory  may  have  to  offer  in  the  specific  
contexts of Canada and France. While these two jurisdictions have much 
in common, important distinctions emerge with respect to the challenges 
posed by religious diversity and what is driving the responses to these 
challenges. 
Through a comparative analysis, this paper begins by attempting to 
delineate the fundamental differences between the approaches of both 
countries to freedom of religion and religious diversity. An analysis 
is then undertaken with respect to the implications for both Canada’s 
and France’s capacities to engage a theory of judgment that uses the 
enlarged mentality to consider religious perspectives. 
† Madeleine Sinclair will be graduating from Dalhousie Law School in May 2006 
and will be clerking at the Supreme Court of British Columbia before completing her 
articles with McCarthy Tétrault in Vancouver.
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The   paper   is   organized   as   follows:   firstly   the   legal   systems,   general  
text of the constitutions and how these relate to religion in society is 
compared; secondly the model of church and state relationship in both 
countries is examined; thirdly, the discussion is situated in the greater 
context of France’s approach generally to the management of diversity; 
finally  a  comparative  analysis  of  the  content  and  delineation  of  freedom  
of religion in both jurisdictions is undertaken
The study essentially concludes that France may be neither interested 
nor capable of including religious perspectives in its deliberations and 
in that respect the validity attained when the enlarged mentality is used 
in judgment may not be achievable. While the paper concludes that 
Nedelsky’s judgment may be possible in Canada, the recent example 
of Muslim personal law (Sharia) in Ontario is used to illustrate that, 
despite all of the right conditions, political will is crucial if we are to 
follow   through  with   the  politically  difficult  decisions   that   follow   from  
them. 
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INTRODUCTION
One does not have to look further than the front page of a national news-
paper in either Canada or France to appreciate the important and con-
tested role religion currently plays in public debate, be it the case of 
headscarves, kirpans, or prayer space in schools, the place of Sharia in 
family law arbitration, or even the debates surrounding same-sex mar-
riage. Many would also likely agree that there has been a tendency in the 
last  fifty  years  or  so  to  “relegate  religion  to  the  private  sphere;;  to  sug-
gest that it should have as little as possible to do with economic, social, 
and political life.”1 It may be that it is time to question the assumptions 
underlying this approach and query whether it is still appropriate given 
today’s socio-political climate. The reality in any democratic society is 
that, at some point, these debates result in binding decisions that, at least 
for a time, must be accepted by all groups whether they accord with the 
views of the group or not.2 The challenge therefore lies in the reality of 
a pluralistic society: perhaps the goal should not be simply to garner 
unanimous agreement or even the greatest consensus possible, but also 
to ensure that decisions be seen by all members of a society as valid, 
whether or not they accord with individual or collective views. 
Hannah Arendt outlined a preliminary theory of judgment before 
she  died  in  which  the  central  concept  is  the  “enlarged  mentality,”  a  con-
cept she borrowed from Kant.3 Essentially, the theory maintains that 
judgment is distinct from both provable truth claims and subjective 
preference  in  that  it  involves  the  act  of  reflecting  on  a  matter  from  the  
perspective of others. Because judgment is itself an inherently subjec-
tive process, it cannot compel others to concur in the way that truth 
claims  can.  It  is  specifically  the  act  of  using  the  “enlarged  mentality,”  
of considering others’ perspectives, that allows judgment to be seen as 
valid by the judging subjects.4  
1  Claude  Ryan,  “In  Place  of  a  Foreword”  in  Douglas  Farrow,  ed., Recognizing 
Religion in a Secular Society: Essays in Pluralism, Religion, and Public Policy 
(Montreal:  McGill-­Queen’s  University  Press,  2004)  ix  [Ryan,  “In  Place”].
2  Ibid.
3  Ronald Beiner, ed., Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy 
(Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1982).  
4  J.  Nedelsky,  “Legislative  Judgment  and  the  Enlarged  Mentality:  Taking  Religious  
Perspectives”  [forthcoming  2006]  at  2  [Nedelsky,  “Legislative  Judgment”].  
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In her work, Nedelsky focuses on how this approach to judgment 
helps us theorize about the optimal role of spiritually or religiously 
based   argument   in   the   public   space.  Although   Nedelsky   specifically  
does not hold her argument to be valid in all times and places, this paper 
intends to examine what her theory may have to offer in the contexts of 
Canada and France. 
Although  her  inquiry  is  specifically  focused  on  the  significance  of  
judgment in legislative functions, namely deliberation on the common 
good and the articulation and evolution of constitutional values, her the-
ory may also have important implications for judgment in the judicial 
context. Her central claim is that thinking about legislative functions in 
terms of judgment and the enlarged mentality will help us develop the 
norms  necessary  for  religiously  based  argument.  She  posits  that  “neither  
the secularist norms nor the most vocal of the religious voices provides 
us  with   a   good  model   for   reflecting   on   optimal   contemporary   norms  
for religiously based argument in the public sphere,” emphasising that 
elucidating these norms becomes crucial as religiously based policy po-
sitions grow in importance.5 
This paper considers both legislative and judicial judgment because 
pragmatically, the site of judgment depends entirely on where these de-
liberations and articulations are taking place.6 One of the central ar-
guments of this paper is precisely that the site, or the ways in which 
institutional structures operate in a given jurisdiction, may make all the 
difference. 
One can legitimately argue that Canada and France have much in 
common. Both are western, liberal, functioning democratic states with 
significant   immigrant  populations.7  It is also fair to say that with re-
5  Ibid. at 4. 
6  A full discussion of why the theory may or may not be applicable to the judicial 
context is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is crucial for this paper to 
consider the implications of judgment using the enlarged mentality in the judicial 
context. The Chief Justice of Canada recently reminded us of the importance of the 
judicial context and rather important role judges play in constitutional law making 
in  Canada:  “[T]he  rule  of  law  requires  judges  to  uphold  unwritten  constitutional  
norms, even in the face of clearly enacted laws or hostile public opinion”. Beverley 
McLachlin  C.J.,  “Unwritten  Constitutional  Principles:  What  is  Going  On?”  (Lecture  
presented  at  the  Lord  Cooke  of  Thorndon  Lecture,  University  of  Wellington,  New  
Zealand,  December  2005)  [unpublished].
7  The  2001  census  in  Canada  revealed  that  immigrants  accounted  for  18.4%  of  
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spect to diversity, both countries subscribe to a version of liberalism 
with limits in terms of what forms of cultural diversity can be accom-
modated and embraced within the larger society.8 In fact, a study of both 
countries reveals agreement that in order to sustain a democratic consti-
tutional order, the state must be able to promulgate certain civic ideals. 
What  these  civic  ideals  are  however,  as  well  as  their  consequent  effects  
on   the  management  of  diversity,  differs  significantly   in   the   two   juris-
dictions. In both countries, diversity presents political and legal chal-
lenges alike, and has important implications for citizenship. Yet in these 
two countries faced with fairly similar challenges, important differences 
emerge, not only in the actual responses to the challenges but perhaps 
more interestingly from an analytical perspective, in what drives those 
very responses. 
In France, one of the most important civic ideals being promulgated 
by  the  state  is  the  doctrine  of  “laïcité” or secularism. In fact, one of the 
most crucial things to understand when engaging in a comparative study 
involving France is the central role that laïcité plays in the neo-repub-
lican discourse on national identity.9 Although one may be tempted to 
translate laïcité as the French equivalent of secularization, it is impor-
tant to understand how qualitatively different it is from a mere statement 
about the separation of church and state. There is an important distinc-
tion to be drawn between a secular state clearly separate from the church 
and secularism as a doctrine and ideal of citizenship promulgated vigor-
ously by the state.10 
the population <www.statcan.ca> while in France, preliminary analysis of the 2004 
census  revealed  that  immigrants  accounted  for  9.6%  of  the  population  <www.insee.
fr>.
8  I am referring here to Kymlicka’s liberal theory of minority rights that posits that 
liberal principles impose two fundamental limitations on minority rights. Firstly, a 
liberal conception of minority rights will not usually justify ‘internal restrictions’, 
the demand by a minority culture to restrict the basic civil or political liberties of its 
own members. Secondly, a liberal conception of minority rights, while being more 
sympathetic to demands for ‘external protections’ that reduce their vulnerability to 
the decisions of the larger society, still imposes limitations to the extent that external 
protections are only legitimate as long as they promote equality between groups. 
Will  Kymlicka,  Multiculturalism Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights 
(Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  1995)  at  152.    
9     Michael,  Leruth  “The  Neorepublican  Discourse  on  French  National  Identity”  
(1998)  16  French  Politics  &  Society  46  [Leruth,  “French  National”].
10  For the purposes of this paper laïcité  will  be  used  to  specifically  denote  the  
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The challenge with the French doctrine then may be to keep secu-
larism from becoming just another sectarianism, but one with universal 
pretension.11  Perhaps   this   is   the  very  challenge  Nedelsky  has   in  mind  
when advocating for the creation of a space and norms through which 
religious   perspectives   can   be   both   heard   and   respected?   Through   a  
comparative analysis of religious diversity and freedom of religion in 
Canada and France, this paper attempts to delineate the fundamental 
differences in the responses of both countries to religious diversity and 
to analyse the implications these differences have for their capacity to 
engage a theory of judgment which uses the enlarged mentality to con-
sider religious perspectives. 
The study essentially concludes that France may be neither inter-
ested nor capable of including religious perspectives in its deliberations 
and in that respect the validity attained when the enlarged mentality is 
used in judgment may not be achievable. The question remains, how-
ever, whether Nedelsky’s judgment is possible in Canada. The claim 
I  make   about  France   is   grounded   in   three   significant   differences   that  
emerge as a result of the comparative analysis. Firstly, the differences in 
the two countries’ church-state models, contrasting the French doctrine 
of laïcité with the state’s duty of neutrality with respect to religion in 
Canada. Related, is a philosophical difference that emerges between the 
two countries with respect to the conception of how and why individual 
autonomy ought to be protected. Secondly, and very much related, is the 
role that laïcité plays as the normative ideal of citizenship in the neo-
republican discourse on French national identity which is perceived to 
be threatened by a multicultural France. This discourse posits the ideal 
French citizen as engaged with public policy issues in purely secular 
terms. Finally, the design of the institutional structures, that is the role of 
the courts in relation to the legislature in France, is an important consid-
eration. My claim is that these structures are inherently vulnerable (or 
amenable  depending  on  one’s  perspective)  to  majorities,  and  that  conse-
quently minority rights will never be well guarded in such a structure. 
French doctrine of secularism.
11     Kwame  Anthony  Appiah,  “The  Limits  of  Being  Liberal”  Global  Agenda  
Magazine  (2004)  online:  Global  Agenda  Magazine  <www.globalagendamagazine.
com>.
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The comparative study of the two countries is organized as follows: 
firstly,  the  legal  systems,  general  text  of  the  constitutions  and  how  these  
relate   to   religion   in   society  will  be  compared;;   secondly   the  model  of  
church  and  state  relationship  in  both  countries  will  be  examined;;  thirdly,  
the discussion will be situated in the greater context of France’s ap-
proach  generally  to  the  management  of  diversity;;  finally  a  comparative  
analysis of the content and delineation of freedom of religion in both 
jurisdictions will be undertaken. 
I. GENERAL CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Several  pieces  of  legislation  –  constitutional  and  other  –  define  freedom  
of religion in France. The starting point is Article 10 of the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and the Citizen which states that: 
No one may be disturbed on account of his opinions, even religious 
ones, as long as the manifestation of such opinions does not interfere 
with the established Law and Order.12  
Article  10  is  important  in  that  it  signifies  the  privatization  of  religion,  
presupposing that religious opinion ought to fall into the private sphere, 
while simultaneously asserting that the expression of any opinion is 
necessarily public and must not disturb the public order.13 
This  privatization  of  religion  was  reaffirmed  in  the  Law  of  1905,14 
which  many  consider  as  marking  the  beginning  of  “true”  French  sec-
ularism.15 Until that point religious institutions had been under State 
control, their social utility publicly recognized.16 At least part of the un-
derlying rationale for the separation was a view that the State ought to 
12  Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen  art  X  online:  <http://confinder.
richmond.edu>  [Article  10].
13  Michel  Troper,  “French  Secularism,  or  Laïcité”  (1999-­2000)  21  Cardozo  L.  Rev.  
1274  [Troper,  “French  Secularism”].
14  Loi du 9 décembre 1905, Loi concernant la séparation des Eglises et de l’Etat, 
J.O., 11 December 1905  [Law  of  1905]  [translated  by  author].
15     Troper,  “French  Secularism”,  supra note 13. 
16  Danièle  Hervieu-­Léger,  “Redefining  Laïcité  in  Multicultural  France”  in  Peter  L.  
Berger,  ed.,  The  Limits  of  Social  Cohesion  (Oxford:  Westview  Press,  1998)  38  at  44  
[Hervieu-­Léger,  “Redefining  Laïcité”].  
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be  supreme  as  it  “has  a  charge  of  men’s  souls  just  as  much  as  a  church  
of community, but in a more universal fashion.”17 Although the law it-
self  neither  contains  an  explicit  separation  nor  an  explicit  affirmation  of  
laïcité, it does enunciate the refusal by the state to recognize any reli-
gion  and  at  once  reaffirms  freedom  of  conscience.  The  result  was  that  
the Republic no longer recognized, funded nor subsidized any religious 
group.18 
The next important document with respect to freedom of religion in 
France is the preamble to the Constitution of 1946,19 which is expressly 
affirmed  and  integrated  as  part  of  the  Constitution  of  1958.20 It asserts 
that  “each  human  being,  without  distinction  of  race,  religion  or  creed,  
possesses  sacred  and  inalienable  rights,”  thereby  affirming  the  right  to  
be free of discrimination based on religion. 
In  Canada,   both   freedom  of   religion   and   conscience   are   affirmed  
in  s.  2(a)  of  the  Charter of Rights and Freedoms.21 The right to be free 
from  discrimination  based  on  religion  in  turn  is  affirmed  in  s.  15(1).22 
Thus, freedom of religion in France, at least on paper, is not framed 
in a drastically different manner from the way it is framed in Canada. 
Both  constitutions  affirm  a  freedom  to  choose  and  express  one’s  beliefs  
in the freedom of conscience, and a freedom to practice one’s religion, 
17     Charles  Renouvier  was  a  French  Philosopher  broadly  regarded  as  one  of  the  
architects  of  the  separation  of  the  church  and  state.  I  say  “at  least”  as  the  Law  of  
1905 is really part of a complex history of the development of the state in France 
of  which  a  full  discussion  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper;;  Charles  Renouvier,  
“L’éducation  et  la  morale”  (1872)  La  Critique  Philosophique  279,  cited  in  Troper,  
“French  Secularism”,  supra note 13. 
18  Art. 2 Law of 1905.
19     France,  Constitution  (1946)  online:  <http://confinder.richmond.edu>.
20     France,  Constitution  (1958)  online:  <http://confinder.richmond.edu>.
21     “Everyone  has  the  right  to  freedom  of  conscience  and  religion”;;  Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,  Part  1  of  the  Constitution Act,  1982,  being  
Schedule B to the Canada Act  1982  (U.K.),  1982,  c.  11  [the  Charter].
22     “Every  individual  is  equal  before  and  under  the  law  and  has  the  right  to  the  equal  
protection  and  equal  benefit  of  the  law  without  discrimination  and,  in  particular,  
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, 
age  or  mental  or  physical  disability”;;  s.  15(1)  of  the  Charter.  It  is  worth  noting  that  
discrimination on the basis of religion is also prohibited in the federal and provincial 
human rights legislation in Canada. The present discussion will be limited to the 
constitutional context.
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commonly  referred  to  in  France  as  “liberty  of  cult.”23 Both constitutions 
also similarly proclaim a right to be free from discrimination on the 
basis of one’s religion.  However, two important differences do emerge. 
Firstly,   in  France,  secularism  is  explicitly  affirmed  as  a  constitutional  
principle: 
France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social 
Republic. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, 
without distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all 
beliefs. It shall be organized on a decentralized basis.24 
No such doctrine or enunciation of the separation of church and state 
appears in the Canadian constitution. A second important difference 
also emerges between the two constitutional frameworks when one 
considers unwritten or implicit constitutional principles. In the case of 
Canada, the Court’s decision in the Reference re Secession of Quebec25 
has important implications for the present discussion as the Court in 
that case gave constitutional status to the principle of the protection of 
minorities. This principle was subsequently explicitly extended to reli-
gious minorities.26 No such principle is found, expressly or impliedly, in 
the text of the French constitution. There is also a tradition with respect 
to minority rights present in the Canadian constitution, namely the s. 23 
minority education language rights and the s. 35 recognition of existing 
aboriginal and treaty rights, which is notably absent from the French 
constitution. 
23     Julien  Taieb,  “Freedom  of  Religion:  from  France  to  the  United  States,  a  National  
Conflict  of  Law”  (2004)  4  Global  Jurist  Advances  1  [Taieb,  “Freedom”].
24  Supra note 20.
25     [1998]  2  S.C.R.  217  at  79  [Reference  Re  Secession].
26  Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem,  [2004]  2  S.C.R.  551  [Syndicat  Northcrest].
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II. THE FRENCH APPROACH
1. Church-state model in France, the republican ideal, and its 
implications for citizenship
In  his  work  “French  Secularism,  or  Laïcité,”27 Michel Troper highlights 
the  difficulties  in  classifying  French  secularism  within  the  traditional  di-
chotomy where either church and state are separate or such a separation 
is absent.28 He emphasizes that, although in France the secular state is 
structurally separate from religion, this does not mean that the state ab-
stains from propagating values.29 Thus, one could argue that the French 
model really belongs in a third intermediary category characterized by 
this function of propagating values. 
As a result of this function, the content of the relationship between 
church and state in France is anything but neutral. On the contrary, the 
doctrine of laïcité propagated by the state plays an important role as 
one of the normative ideals of French citizenship.30Although this is not 
a new idea in French society, laïcité as a normative ideal is experienc-
ing a resurgence of sorts in that it is being drawn on heavily in the face 
of new challenges. As France grows increasingly pluralistic, religious 
diversity  has  come   to  be  perceived,  at   least  by  some,  as  an  “obstacle  
to a citizenship conceived in terms of the autonomy of the individual, 
gender equality, and the ability of individuals to place distance between 
themselves and their community roots.”31 
“A  clear  sign  of  the  times,”  Leruth  writes,  is  that  the  ‘Right’  in  France  
is no longer alone in suggesting that the preservation of national identity 
ought to be a national priority.32  Many  point  to  the  publication  in  1989  
in  a  popular  French  newspaper  of  an  article  written  by  five  left-­leaning  
27  Supra note 13. 
28     Troper,  “French  Secularism”,  supra note 13.
29  Troper,  “French  Secularism”,  supra note 13.
30     Micheline  Milot,  “L’Ecole  et  la  diversité  religieuse  au  Canada  et  au  Québec”  
(Paper  presented  to  the  Perspectives  Canadiennes  et  Francaises  sur  la  Diversité,  
October  2003)  online:  <www.pch.gc.ca>.
31  Ibid. 
32  Supra note 9 at 46.
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philosophers33 as one of the key events that sparked a heated debate on 
laïcité  which  has  pervaded  French  society  for  the  last  fifteen  years.  The  
article called on the government to take a tougher stance on the wearing 
of Muslim headscarves in schools. The philosophers made three main 
points34 in their appeal, many of which a 2004 law35  banning  “ostenta-
tious”  religious  symbols  in  schools  picked  up  on.  Their  first  point  was  
that the school’s mission above all is to train young people to act and 
think like citizens of the Republic, stressing that citizenship involves 
a duty to employ rational faculties of judgment to transcend personal 
prejudices. They argued that the students’ religious a priori should not 
interfere with the neutral classroom environment required to develop 
these faculties. Their second point was an attack on the philosophy of 
multiculturalism, arguing that the right to be different means nothing 
if it is not met with a right to be different from one’s difference. The 
school, they argued, should be a place of individual emancipation. The 
authors argued thirdly that France must avoid tailoring public education 
to  meet  the  needs  of  specific  communities,  as  this  runs  contrary  to  the  
value of universalism, which the school must preserve. 
In order to fully understand the present construction of French iden-
tity that these philosophers are arguing should be preserved, one would 
need to look at least as far back as the Revolution to see that, to some 
degree,  French  identity  has  always  “depended  on  the  idea  that  citizen-
ship  should   transcend  community   ties  and  define,  beyond  all  particu-
larisms,   a  national   “we”  with  which  each  person  can   identify.”36 The 
“Rousseau-­influenced   revolutionary   hostility   to   intermediary   groups  
and ‘factions’ – associated with privileges, divisiveness, and corruption 
– shaped a view of republican democracy as essentially unitary, perma-
nently fragile and under threat.”37 It is as though a national conscious-
33  Elisabeth  Badinter  et  al.  “Profs,  ne  capitulons  pas!”  Le  Nouvel  Observateur  (2  
November  1989)  online:  Le  Nouvel  Observateur  <www.nouvelobs.com>  [translated  
by  author].
34  This summary refers to a summary and translation of the main arguments as cited 
in  Leruth,  “French  National”,  supra note 9.
35  Loi nº 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004, J.O., 17 March 2004, 5190  [the  2004  law]  
[translated  by  author].
36     Hervieu-­Léger,  “Redefining  Laïcité”,  supra note 16 at 57.
37     Cécile  Laborde,  “Secular  Philosophy  and  Muslim  Headscarves  in  Schools”  
(2005)  13  The  Journal  of  Political  Philosophy  316  [Laborde,  “Secular  Philosophy”].
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ness developed over time, founded on this idea that the public sphere 
requires  protection  from  the  intrusion  of  “particular  loyalties,  identities  
or groups, lest it allow the ‘general will’ to disaggregate into myriad 
conflicting  private  wills.”38 
Since the Revolution, the historical confrontation between a Catho-
lic France and a laïque France has resulted in the establishment of a very 
particular  and  jealously  guarded  identity;;  a  laïque country of Catholic 
culture.39 Laborde argues that the struggle whereby the republican state 
established itself in the face of a domineering Catholic Church resulted 
in an assumption by the state of the spiritual mission previously entrust-
ed to the church.40 The importance placed on the school in this debate 
appears to have stemmed from this struggle. After centuries of struggle 
and   a  final   formal   separation   in  190541, the Republic was faced with 
the  task  of  creating  “citizens”  out  of  “believers.”42 The school thus be-
came  the  logical  place  in  which  to  “engage  in  a  strong  formative  project,  
aimed at the inculcation of the public values of democratic and egalitar-
ian citizenship, and introduce an alternative set of civil symbols into the 
public sphere, so as to lead citizens to endorse a robust public identity 
capable of transcending more particular religious, cultural, and class 
loyalties.”43
While   the   focal   point   of   the   tension   in  France   is   still   the   school,  
the  dynamic  of  the  conflict  no  longer  simply  involves  Catholicism  and  
republicanism diametrically opposed, vying over control of the public 
space. The fact is that the operative community ties have changed and 
the requirement that they be transcended appears to be posing different 
challenges.  The  conflict  is  no  longer  with  religion  in  and  of  itself;;  the  
‘problem’  of  significant  religious  and  cultural  diversity  has  been  added  
to  the  mix.  What  is  inherently  problematic  from  an  analytical  perspec-
tive is that the citizenry, and therefore the interests, have changed fun-
38  Ibid. Despite its obvious relevance to the present discussion, a real discussion 
of the genesis of this French consciousness or identity is unfortunately beyond the 
scope of this paper.
39     Hervieu-­Léger,  “Redefining  Laïcité”,  supra note 16 at 57.
40  Laborde,  “Secular  Philosophy”,  supra note 37.
41  Referring to the Law of 1905.
42     Laborde,  “Secular  Philosophy”,  supra note 37.
43  Laborde,  “Secular  Philosophy”,  supra note 37.
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damentally yet this ideal of citizenship predicated on secularism at all 
costs is still being called on to do all the work of reconciling. 
2. Diversity in France
In  light  of  the  above  discussion  and  the  significance  of  the  threat  (per-
ceived  or  actual)  presented  by  diversity  to  the  state’s  promulgated  ideal  
of  citizenship,  it  is  worth  situating  the  conflict  in  France’s  broader  ap-
proach to diversity. 
France,  like  many  other  Western  European  countries,  has  really  only  
dealt with large-scale immigration in relatively recent history. It was 
not  until  after  WWII  that  immigrants  were  welcomed,  recruited  even,  
to provide labour during a time of rapid growth.44 The recession in the 
1970s marked the end of this trend, and the beginning of serious ef-
forts to slow, limit, and even cease immigration completely.45 The last 
two decades have witnessed a very real hardening in the position on 
immigration of all political parties, perhaps as a result of the growing 
popularity  of  Jean-­Marie  Le  Pen’s  Front  National.  In  2002,  Le  Pen  man-
aged  to  finish  second  in  the  primary  presidential  election  running  on  an  
essentially anti-immigrant platform.46 Immigration has been blamed for 
nearly every social ill in France, including unemployment and a rising 
crime rate, not to mention the perceived threat to the country’s national 
identity outlined above.47
Despite these sentiments, France has nonetheless become one of 
the most multi-ethnic countries in Europe with the proportion of for-
eign-­born  residents  at  around  10%  or  5.9  million  people.48 In general, 
44  Monica  Nigh  Smith,  “France  for  the  French?”  The  Europeans?  The  Caucasians?:  
The Latest French Immigration Reform and the Attempts at Justifying its 
Disproportionate  Impact  on  Non-­white  Immigrants”  (2005)  14  Transnat’l  L.  
Contemp.  Probs.  2  [Smith,  “Immigration  Reform”].
45     Joel  S.  Fetzer  &  J.  Christopher  Soper, Muslims and the State in Britain, France, 
and Germany  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2005)  at  64.
46  Online: Front National <www.frontnational.com>
47     Smith,  “Immigration  Reform”,  supra note 44 at 1.
48     The  2001  census  in  Canada  revealed  that  immigrants  accounted  for  18.4%  of  the  
population, online: Statistics Canada <www.statcan.ca>, while in France, preliminary 
analysis  of  the  2004  census  revealed  that  immigrants  accounted  for  9.6%  of  the  
population,  online:  Institut  National  <www.insee.fr>  [translated  by  author].
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France’s response to an ever increasingly diverse population has always 
been a strong goal of integration and assimilation. The extent of this ef-
fort to assimilate is evident in the country’s law banning the collection 
of  all   statistics   reflecting   the   religion  or  ethnicity  of   the  population.49 
One  need   look  no   further   than   the  charred   remains  of  8,973  vehicles  
torched during the 20 nights of rioting in October and November of this 
year to understand that these efforts to integrate and assimilate have not 
been entirely successful.50  While  what  exactly  caused  and  perpetuated  
the riots is disputable, it is widely held that French society’s negative 
perceptions of Islam and of immigrants and the resulting alienation felt 
by  many  French  Muslims  was  a  significant  factor.51 
As French sociologist Alain Touraine points out, part of the prob-
lem is that the universalism that is so central to the French republican 
model has led to a rejection and inferiorisation of those who are ‘dif-
ferent.’52 He argues that, while rejecting communitarianism has been a 
positive outcome of this transcending of differences, the French model 
is problematic in that it does not allow for the recognition of differences, 
thus violating the right of each individual to have his or her freedom of 
religion  and  cultural  affiliations  respected.  In  this  sense  he  argues  that  
France’s national ‘we’ that is guarded so jealously, is becoming a threat 
to itself. Faced with a republicanism loaded with prejudice and aggres-
sive  communitarianism,  he  argues  that  France  must  find  a  way  to  com-
bine integration and universalism with the recognition of differences 
and respect for the cultural rights of all. 
3. Freedom of religion in France
As mentioned earlier in the discussion of the general constitutional 
framework, freedom of religion in France is protected in several legal 
texts, namely Article 10 of The Declaration of the Rights of Man of 
49  Loi nº78-17 du 6 janvier 1978,  Loi  relative  à  l’informatique,  aux  fichiers  et  aux  
libertés,  J.O.  7  June  1978  [translated  by  author].
50     “Nicolas  Sarkozy  sort  renforcé  de  la  crise  des  banlieues”  Le Monde (17 
November  2005)  online:  Le  Monde  <www.lemonde.fr>  [translated  by  author].
51     “Ghettos  shackle  French  Muslims”  BBC  News  (31  October  2005)  online:  BBC  
News <www.bbc.co.uk>.
52     Alain  Touraine  “Les  Francais  piégés  par  leur  moi  national”  Le Monde  (8  
November  2005)  online:  Le  Monde  <www.lemonde.fr>  [translated  by  author].
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1789,53 the preamble to the Constitution of 194654 and article 2 of the 
Constitution  of  1958.55 
Freedom of religion in French law is essentially composed of two 
distinct  elements:  the  first  is  freedom  of  conscience,  which  encompasses  
the right to choose and express one’s faith and consequently to not be 
discriminated against on the basis of one’s religion and the second, re-
ferred  to  as  ‘liberty  of  cult,’  guarantees   the  right   to  “put   into  practice  
one’s religious commandments.”56 Liberty of cult basically precludes 
the state from interfering with the doctrines taught, ceremonies, holy 
days and the general internal functioning of a given religious commu-
nity.57
As stated above, one of the milestones in the intellectuals’ rediscov-
ery of the republican ideal was an open letter to the government pub-
lished in a popular newspaper by a group of French philosophers urging 
the government to take a tougher stance on headscarves in schools.58 
This was in response to the much-publicised expulsion of two Muslim 
schoolgirls who refused to remove their headscarves.59 Because of the 
significance  of  these  events  and  the  role  they  have  played  in  the  neo-­re-
publican  discourse  on  national  identity,  as  well  as  the  significance  of  the  
school in any discussion of secularism in France, it makes sense to nar-
row the discussion of freedom of religion in France to how the debates 
have played out in that context. 
On the 15th   of  March   2004,   Statute   n.   2004-­228,60 better known 
around the world as the ban on Muslim headscarves in schools, was 
enacted. Until that point, it had been the duty of judges at the Conseil 
d’Etat61 (the  administrative  court)  to  balance laïcité and the right to free-
53  Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen  art  X  online:  <http://confinder.
richmond.edu>  [Article  10].
54  Supra note 19.
55  Supra note 20.
56     Taieb,  “Freedom”,  supra note 23.
57     Taieb,  “Freedom”,  supra note 23.
58  Leruth,  “French  National”,  supra note 9.
59  Taieb,  “Freedom”,  supra  note  23  at  8.
60  Loi nº 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004, J.O.,  17  March  2004,  5190  [the  2004  law]  
[translated  by  author].
61  The Conseil d’Etat is the highest administrative court in France. The 
administrative courts are generally concerned with litigation involving the 
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dom of religion on a case-by-case basis, operating under an assumption 
that the two could be reconciled. The statute is intended to end a decade 
and  a  half  long  debate  otherwise  known  as  the  “headscarf  affair”  which  
began  in  1989  with  the  aforementioned  events.
These events prompted the Minister of Education to ask the Conseil 
to advise on whether the wearing of symbols of belonging to a reli-
gious community is compatible with the principle of laïcité, given the 
principles in the Constitution, the laws of the Republic and the rules 
pertaining to the organization and functioning of public schools.62 In its 
opinion, the Conseil handed down a set of guidelines stating clearly that 
the headscarves were not in and of themselves in breach of the principle 
of laïcité and that laïcité did not justify prohibiting religious expression. 
Religious freedom could only be limited when it presented an obsta-
cle to the accomplishment of the statutory mission of public education. 
Thus, religious symbols could be prohibited when their display consti-
tuted an act of pressure, proselytism, propaganda or provocation, when 
they  threatened  the  “good  order”  of  the  school  or  posed  a  threat  to  health  
and safety. The Conseil delegated the task of deciding on a case-by-case 
basis whether these conditions were met to the school principals.
This   approach   proved   difficult   to   implement   as   evidenced   by   the  
Kherouaa63 case, which the Conseil heard three years later. Essentially 
the  guidelines  provided  in  the  1989  decision  were  entirely  disregarded  
when three Muslim girls were once again expelled from their public 
school for violating a school rule prohibiting all distinctive symbols in-
dicative of belonging to a religious, political or philosophical order. The 
bulk  of  the  decision  is  actually  identical  to  the  1989  decision.64  In  find-
ing that none of the conditions required for prohibition were either al-
administration;;  Catherine  Elliott  and  Catherine  Vernon,  French Legal System 
(Harlow:  Pearson  Education  Limited,  2000)  at  78  [The  French  Legal  System].
62     Cons.  d’Etat,  27  November  1989,  Port de signe d’appartenance à une 
communauté religieuse (foulard islamique),  n°  346.893,  <www.conseil-­etat.fr>  
[the  1989  decision]  [translated  by  author].  Although  the  Conseil  d’Etat  is  generally  
concerned with litigation involving the administration, the government has wide 
discretion to seek the Conseil d’Etat’s advice when confronted with an administrative 
problem;;  The  French  Legal  System,  supra  note  61  at  81.  
63  Cons.  d’Etat,  2  November  1992,  nº  130394  [Kherouaa].
64     I  do  not  mean  to  imply  that  the  1989  decision  is  cited  but  that  the  decision  is  
literally  copied  word  for  word  without  citation.    Pasted  into  the  Kherouaa  decision  
without acknowledgment.
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leged or established, the Conseil overturned the decision and reinstated 
the girls as students at the school. 
Further   hostility   to   the   1989   decision   and   the   Court’s   attempt   to  
balance the principle of laïcité was demonstrated when the Minister of 
Education published a regulation essentially calling on school princi-
pals   to  ban  “ostentatious”   religious   signs.  The  principles   invoked  are  
essentially those that later inspired the 2004 law. 
In France, the national project and the republican project have 
merged around a certain idea of citizenship. This French idea of the 
nation and the Republic is, by nature, respectful of all convictions, 
in particular of religious convictions, political convictions and of 
cultural traditions. But it excludes the fragmenting of the nation into 
separate communities, indifferent to one another, only considering 
their own rules and laws, engaged in simple coexistence. The nation 
is not just a collection of citizens holding individual rights. This 
ideal is built initially at the school.  The school is the premier place 
of education and integration where all children and all young people 
come together and learn how to live together and to respect each 
other. The presence, in school, of signs and behaviours that show 
that students cannot conform to the same obligations, nor take the 
same courses and follow the same programs, would be a negation of 
this mission.  All discrimination, be it on the basis of gender, culture 
or religion must be left at the door.  This secular and national ideal 
is the very substance of the school of the Republic and the basis of 
the civic duty of education.  This is why it is not possible to accept 
the presence and the multiplication of symbols so ostentatious that 
their effect is precisely to separate certain pupils from the common 
rules of the life of the school. These symbols are, in themselves, the 
elements of proselytism.65
The regulation provides substantial support to the argument above that 
secularism in France does much more than negotiate the terms of the 
relationship  between  church  and  state.  This  statement  affirms  the  crucial  
role secularism plays in the republican ideal. The perceived threat to this 
ideal and the emphasis on the school as the breeding ground for the new 
French citizen are also immediately apparent. 
It has been said that it was the situation of legal uncertainty, where 
decisions were left to principals to make on a case-by-case basis, which 
65  Bulletin  officiel  du  ministère  de  l’Education  nationale, N° 35, 29 September 
1994,  2528  [translated  by  author].
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prompted the legislature to step in and convene the Stasi Commission 
which ultimately drafted the 2004 law.66 Although it is likely that the 
lack of legal certainty was a factor, it seems impossible to conclude 
from the above dialogue between the Conseil, the schools and the leg-
islature  that  there  was  not  also  a  significant  degree  of  hostility  towards  
the Conseil’s   interpretation  of  secularism  as  a  flexible  principle   to  be  
reconciled with religious freedom. 
The Stasi Commission, mostly composed of academics and politi-
cians, was formed in July 2003 and was charged with the task of propos-
ing a theoretical and practical framework for the revival of secularism in 
the Republic.67 Most politicians defended the idea of adopting a statute 
with some notable exceptions.68 Nevertheless, the report69 was adopted 
unanimously  five  months  later.  The  report  made  several  recommenda-
tions for a new law on laïcité whose aim would be to, on the one hand 
provide precise rules regarding the functioning of public services, and 
on the other hand foster the spiritual diversity of the country. 
The report made several recommendations with respect to a new 
law on laïcité  including  a  proposed  ban  on  all  “ostentatious”70 symbols 
demonstrating  a  religious  or  political  affiliation.  The  law  also  included  a  
proposal to make Yom Kippur71 and Eid al-Fitr72 pedagogical holidays, 
a proposal to allow employees to choose one religious holiday a year as 
an additional statutory holiday and a proposal to create a national school 
66  Supra note 23.
67  The commission consisted of 20 members. Its mandate was included in the 
“Lettre  de  mission”  sent  July  3,  2003  from  the  President  to  Bernard  Stasi  online:  
<ladocumentationfrancaise.fr>.
68  Nicolas Sarkozy, the Minister of the Interior at the time, was one of these 
notable exceptions. Mr Sarkozy warned that the statute could stigmatize the Islamic 
community in France and that if the real goal was integration that this could not be 
achieved  solely  through  banning  headscarves  in  schools.  Taieb,  “Freedom”,  supra 
note 23.
69     Rapport  Commission  Stasi,  online:  <www.fil-­info-­France.com>.
70  This includes large crosses, the Kippa and the Muslim headscarf. This does 
not include small crosses, small stars of David, hands of Fatima and pocket sized 
Korans. 
71  Jewish day of atonement.
72  The celebration when the fast is broken at the end of Ramadan.
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of Islamic studies73.  The  President  of  the  Republic  however,  chose  only  
to adopt the ban on religious symbols. 
Overall, one could argue that the report is wholly inadequate con-
sidering its mandate which included such unrealistic goals as to change 
mentalities  and  habits,  fight  racial  discrimination  in  the  public  and  pri-
vate spheres, impose a strict respect for laïcité in the public services, 
and to enhance spiritual diversity, as all it did practically was enable the 
adoption of the 2004 law.74
It is interesting to note what commissioners have said about the 
Commission since the law’s adoption. At least one commissioner has 
said that truthfully there was never any real debate over whether or not 
there should be a law, rather only about what the law should contain. 
He emphasized that there was a sentiment amongst commissioners that 
an administrative guideline would not have been enough to assuage the 
pressure  of  public  opinion  surrounding  the  issue;;  a  unanimous  vote  in  
favour of a statute was necessary. He also admitted that he felt the work 
of the Commission was necessarily unbalanced as the most important 
goal had always been to say ‘no’ to Islamic fundamentalism.75
As mentioned above, in some ways the law represents a certain hos-
tility toward the courts engaging in a balancing act, trying to recon-
cile laïcité with the guarantee of freedom of religion. The Conseil was 
prepared to assume the two principles could be reconciled and limit 
freedom of religion only where it was necessary to, i.e. when there was 
an act of pressure, proselytism, propaganda or provocation, where the 
‘good order’ of the school was threatened or where a threat was posed 
to health and safety. The effect of the 2004 law, in contrast, is to end the 
competence of the Conseil to engage in this balancing exercise, thereby 
making an implicit statement that laïcité  is  not  after  all  a  ‘flexible  prin-
ciple’ and imposing serious internal limitations on the right to freedom 
of religion. 
73  It should be noted that no information is given about whether this school would 
be run by or funded by the state.
74     Taieb,  “Freedom”,  supra note 23 at 44.
75     Philippe  Bernard  “Membre  de  la  commission  Stasi,  Alain  Touraine  raconte  sa  
conversion au principe d’une loi” Le Monde  (18  December  2003)  online:  Le Monde 
<www.lemonde.fr>  [translated  by  author].
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III. THE CANADIAN APPROACH
 1. Church-state model in Canada 
The Canadian model of the relationship between church and state stands 
in  stark  contrast  to  its  French  counterpart.  Whereas  the  French  relation-
ship is characterized by its positive content, the Canadian one is very 
much characterized by its neutrality. Rather than secularism being a 
value or doctrine to be propagated in and of itself, secularism in Canada 
exists to provide a framework within which tolerance and respect for 
diversity are meant to be fostered. As such, it imposes a duty of neutral-
ity on the state. 
This duty of neutrality was perhaps most recently clearly enunciated 
in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Canada’s  (the  “Court”)  decision  in  Lafontaine,76 
in which the Court looked at whether the municipality of Lafontaine had 
lawfully denied an application for rezoning to permit a congregation of 
Jehovah’s  Witnesses  to  build  a  place  of  worship.  Lebel,  J.  wrote  that  the  
result of the clear distinction that exists between churches and public 
authorities is that the state is now under a duty of neutrality. He goes on 
to say that this concept of neutrality 
allows churches and their members to play an important role in 
the public space where societal debates take place, while the state 
acts as an essentially neutral intermediary in relations between the 
various denominations and between those denominations and civil 
society.77
This  notion  was  equally  affirmed  in  the  Court’s  decision  in  Chamber-
lain78 where it considered the meaning of strict secularism in the School 
Act79 with respect to a decision by a school board to ban books depict-
ing same-sex parented families. In holding that the school board ought 
not to have banned the books, McLachlin C.J., writing for the majority, 
76  Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de St-Jérôme-Lafontaine v. Lafontaine 
(Village) Lafontaine,  [2004]  2  S.C.R.  650  [Lafontaine].
77  Ibid. at 67.
78  Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36,  [2002]  4  S.C.R.  710  
[Chamberlain].
79  School Act,  R.S.B.C.  1996,  c.  412  [School  Act].  
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held that the requirement of secularism in the Act implied that, while the 
board was free to address the religious concerns of parents, this must 
be done in such a way as to give equal recognition and respect to other 
members of the community. In holding that religious views ought not to 
be  “left  at  the  boardroom  door,”  the  Court  stated  that  those  views  could  
nonetheless not be used to exclude the concerns of a minority group as 
each  group  ought  to  be  “given  as  much  recognition  as  it  can  consistently  
demand while giving the same recognition to others.”80 
In  a  sense  then,  the  state  is  not  so  much  a  player  in  these  conflicts  
as it is a referee, there to ensure that all parties with a stake are playing 
by the rules. The state’s role is limited to ensuring81 that a proper legal 
and social framework exists in which individuals and groups are able to 
meaningfully exercise their freedom of religion while ensuring mutual 
tolerance and respect for the diversity of opinions and convictions that 
exist in a pluralistic society such as Canada. The state in France, on the 
other hand, has itself an interest to be protected. The state is seen as a 
crucial player, guarding against the threat that religion poses to an ideal 
of citizenship founded on the autonomy of the individual and his ability 
to place distance between himself and his community roots.82 
2. Freedom of religion in Canada
In  Canada,   the  content  of   the  guarantee   in  s.  2(a)  of   the  Charter83 of 
freedom of religion has been gradually shaped by the Court in its twenty 
or so years of jurisprudence since the Charter came into effect. The 
Court’s  definition  is  an  expansive  one  and  one  which  revolves  around  
the notion of personal choice and individual autonomy and freedom.84 
It is interesting, preliminarily, to contrast this notion of individual au-
tonomy as a right to be protected within the right to freedom of religion 
with the French defence of the principle of laïcité which presumes that 
80  Chamberlain, supra  note  78  at  19.
81  Lafontaine, supra  note  76  at  68.
82  Micheline  Milot,  “L’Ecole  et  la  diversité  religieuse  au  Canada  et  au  Québec”  
(Paper  presented  to  the  Perspectives  Canadiennes  et  Francaises  sur  la  Diversité,  
October  2003)  online:  <  www.pch.gc.ca>  [translated  by  author].
83  Ibid.
84  Syndicat Northcrest, supra note 26.
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individual autonomy can only truly be achieved when an individual is 
able   to  divorce  himself   from  his   religious  affiliations.  This  highlights  
the very different philosophies that imbue the two approaches when one 
considers that this presumption, which is distinctly absent from the Ca-
nadian  approach,  does  so  much  of  the  justificatory  work  in  the  French  
approach.
Dickson  J.  (as  he  then  was)  first  defined  what  was  meant  by  freedom  
of religion in R v. Big M Drug Mart:85 
T]he  essence  of   the  concept  of   freedom  of   religion   is   the   right   to  
entertain such religious beliefs as a person chooses, the right to 
declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance or 
reprisal, and the right to manifest religious belief by worship and 
practice or by teaching and dissemination.86
Dickson J. also articulated the purpose of freedom of religion in 
Big M: 
[T]he  values   that  underlie  our  political   and  philosophic   traditions  
demand that every individual be free to hold and to manifest 
whatever beliefs and opinions his or her conscience dictates, 
provided inter alia only that such manifestations do not injure his or 
her neighbours or their parallel rights to hold and manifest beliefs 
and opinions of their own.87
The  content  and  definition  of   the  right   in  s.  2(a)  has  been  further  de-
lineated by a number of cases. The Court in R v. Jones88 emphasized 
that  a  trivial  effect  on  religion  will  not  breach  the  guarantee  in  s.  2(a).  
Thus,  s.  2(a)  does  not  require  the  legislature  to  refrain  from  imposing  
any burden at all on the practice of religion. In Jones, the appellant al-
leged that requiring him to apply to the school board for an exemption 
for his children from mandatory school attendance so that they could 
be home-schooled violated his freedom of conscience and religion as it 
forced him to acknowledge the school board and not God as the source 
of the right and obligation to educate his children. The Court did not 
85  R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.,  [1985]  1  S.C.R.  295  at  336  [Big  M].
86  Ibid.  [emphasis  in  original].
87  Ibid. at 346.
88  R v. Jones  [1986]  2  S.C.R.  284  [Jones].
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accept that this represented more than a trivial effect on his freedom of 
religion. 
From time to time situations arise where rights within the Char-
ter  itself  come  into  conflict.  In  deciding  whether  the  proposed  legisla-
tion extending civil marriage to same-sex couples89 was consistent with 
the  guarantee  in  s.  2(a),  the  Court  discussed  how  a  ‘collision  of  rights’  
should be resolved.90 The Court reminds us that a limit on religious free-
dom  will   only   be   required  where   a   true   conflict   of   interests   is  made  
out91  before  explaining  that  when  such  a  conflict  does  arise,  it  must  be  
resolved  using  the  justificatory  principles  in  s.1  of  the  Charter to bal-
ance the interests at stake.92  The  Court  also  clearly  states  that  conflicts  of  
rights  do  not  represent  a  conflict  with  the  Charter itself, but rather that 
these  conflicts  are  to  be  resolved  within  the  Charter.93 
This approach was used by the Court in Trinity Western,94 a case in 
which  Trinity  Western  University  (TWU),  a  private  institution  associ-
ated with the Evangelical Free Church of Canada, alleged that a refusal 
by  the  B.C.  College  of  Teachers  (BCCT)  to  accredit  a  teacher-­training  
program  on  the  basis  that  TWU  appeared  to  follow  discriminatory  prac-
tices  infringed  the  right  to  freedom  of  religion  in  s.  2(a).  The  concern  
was  that  the  ‘Community  Standards’  of  TWU  embodied  discrimination  
on  the  basis  of  sexual  orientation.  TWU  students,  faculty  and  staff  were  
asked   to  sign  a  document  agreeing   to  refrain  from  “practices   that  are  
89     Proposal  for  an  Act  respecting  certain  aspects  of  legal  capacity  for  marriage  for  
civil  purposes,  Order  in  Council  P.C.  2003-­1055,  preamble,  ss.  1,  2.
90  Reference re Same-Sex Marriage  [2004]  3  S.C.R.  698  at  50  [Same-Sex 
Marriage].
91  The Court here is referring to its decision in Trinity Western University v. British 
Columbia College of Teachers  [2001]  1  S.C.R.  772  [Trinity Western].
92  This is also the approach followed in R v. Keegstra  [1990]  3  S.C.R.  697,  where  
a person accused of promoting hatred against Jews claimed that his right to freedom 
of expression was being infringed. It is important to note that although resolving 
the  conflict  using  the  justificatory  analysis  in  s.  1  or  “ad  hoc  balancing”  is  the  
more common approach adopted by the Court, the Court has also engaged in some 
“definitional  balancing”  when  resolving  conflicts  between  rights,  for  example  in  R 
v. O’Connor [1995]  4  S.C.R.  411  (Peter  Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2004 
student  ed.  (Toronto:  Carswell,  2004)  at  739).  A  full  discussion  of  this  point  however,  
is beyond the scope of this paper. 
93  Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 90 at 52.
94  Supra note 91.
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biblically condemned” including homosexual behaviour. The issue then 
was  the  proper  definition  of  the  scope  of  the  right  to  freedom  of  religion  
and of the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of sexual ori-
entation. The Court explicitly stated that neither one is absolute and that 
the  “proper  place  to  draw  the  line  is  generally  between  belief  and  con-
duct.”95 Thus, the freedom to hold a belief is broader than the freedom 
to act on one.96 As the Court found no evidence that training teachers 
at  TWU  would  foster  discrimination  in  the  schools  where  these  teach-
ers would go on to teach, the Court held that their freedom to adhere to 
certain beliefs should be respected. The BCCT was wrong to presume 
a potential danger for the rights of others or the social order from reli-
gious doctrine. The Court was thus able to circumscribe the rights that 
had  come  into  conflict  and  reconcile  them  within  the  Charter.  
In Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 1597 the Court held 
that  the  New  Brunswick  Human  Rights  Commission  was  correct  in  find-
ing that a school board had discriminated against the appellant and his 
children in the provision of accommodation, services or facilities98 on 
the basis of religion and ancestry when the board continued to employ a 
teacher who publicly made racist and discriminatory comments against 
Jews  in  his  off-­duty  time.  This  case  is  significant  because  although  the  
beliefs and opinions held by the teacher were held to be discriminatory, 
LaForest, J., writing for the whole court, held that the teacher’s freedom 
of religion was nevertheless infringed. He stated that assuming the sin-
cerity of the beliefs and opinions, it is not open to the courts to question 
their validity, thus leaving the task of reconciling competing rights to 
the s. 199 analysis. This external limiting of the right is exactly the ap-
proach that France has departed from in refusing to balance freedom of 
religion with the secularist goals of society. 
The holding in Syndicat Northcrest 100 is related in that the Court 
emphasized that there is no requirement, when invoking a right to re-
ligious freedom, to prove that beliefs are objectively valid with re-
95  Trinity Western, supra note 91 at 36.
96  Trinity Western, supra note 91 at 36.
97  [1996]  1  S.C.R.  825.
98  Human Rights Act,  R.S.N.B.  1973,  c.  H-­11,  ss.  5(1).
99  Of the Charter.
100  Supra note 26.
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spect to other members of the same religion. Rather, once again, if 
anything must be shown, it is only that a belief is sincere. A require-
ment to show an objective religious obligation would run counter to 
the underlying purposes and principles of the right guaranteed in s. 
2(a).    In  Syndicat Northcrest,101 Iaccobucci, J., writing for the major-
ity, held that the by-laws of a condominium building that prevented 
the appellants from building succahs102 on their balconies infringed 
their religious freedom. The majority balanced the right to religious 
freedom engaged against the co-owners’ rights to the peaceful enjoy-
ment of their property and personal security protected in ss. 1 and 6 of 
the Quebec Charter103 and held that the co-owners’ interests could not 
reasonably be considered as imposing valid limits on the exercise of 
the appellants’ religious freedom. 
CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR JUDGMENT 
Recalling the discussion at the start of this paper regarding the need for 
the development of norms through which religious argument could be 
included in pubic debate, it becomes apparent through a comparative 
analysis that the legitimacy of religious argument may be totally pre-
cluded in a given jurisdiction by the content of the state-church relation-
ship, the ideals of citizenship promulgated by the state, and the overall 
design of the institutional structures. 
Firstly, as evidenced by the comparison of the two countries, the 
content  of  the  church-­state  relationship,  or  specifically  whether  this  re-
lationship has any content at all, matters greatly. In France, the state’s 
101  Supra note 26.
102  The word succah means booth or hut in Hebrew. During Succot, Jews eat their 
meals, entertain guests, relax, and even sleep in a succah, a temporary structure.  The 
succah is reminiscent of the type of huts in which the ancient Israelites dwelt during 
their  40  years  of  wandering  in  the  desert  after  the  Exodus  from  Egypt,  and  reflects  
God’s benevolence in providing for all their needs in the desert. Online: <wikipedia.
org>.
103  Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms,  R.S.Q.,  c.  C-­12  [Quebec Charter];;  
s.  1:  “Every  human  being  has  a  right  to  life,  and  to  personal  security,  inviolability  
and  freedom”;;  s.  6:  “Every  person  has  a  right  to  the  peaceful  enjoyment  and  free  
disposition of his property, except to the extent provided by law”.
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role as the propagator and guardian of the doctrine of laïcité has re-
sulted in a conception of citizenship that is predicated on a notion of 
individual autonomy in which an individual is not truly autonomous if 
he  has  not  been  emancipated  from  his  religious  affiliations.   It   is  only  
once this emancipation has taken place that he is truly able to participate 
fully in the community’s deliberations on the public good. In Canada, as 
noted above, a very different view of individual autonomy with regards 
to freedom of religion is espoused. It is apparent from the delineation 
and  content  the  Court  has  given  to  s.  2(a),   that  a  notion  of  individual  
autonomy is seen as an essential part of what is being protected within 
the guarantee of freedom of religion. Freedom of religion guarantees 
not  only  a  right  to  “entertain  such  religious  beliefs  as  a  person  chooses,”  
but perhaps more importantly for this discussion, the right to hold and 
manifest such beliefs is only limited by their actual injury to others’ par-
allel rights.104 This difference, coupled with the state’s role in Canada as 
one of a neutral intermediary, results in there being much more potential 
in the Canadian context for a view of religiously based policy positions 
as legitimate.
The second apparent difference in the two approaches is highlighted 
by the reaction in France to a perceived threat that multiculturalism pos-
es to French national identity. As articulated above, French identity con-
tinues to depend on an idea of citizenship that requires one to transcend 
community ties and abandon all particularisms so that all may come 
together  to  define  a  national  French  ‘we’  with  which  each  person  can  
identify. It is probably not such a stretch to suggest that many Canadians 
on the surface deplore the idea that one ought to rise above all else, to 
be  French  first  and  foremost,  in  order  to  ensure  a  seat  at  the  table.  But  is  
there  no  such  national  ‘we’  in  Canada?  Or  is  it  just  that  our  ‘we’  is  more  
immune  to  criticism  as  it  also  conveniently  claims  cultural  neutrality?  
Taylor  reminds  us  to  be  cognizant  of  the  fact  that  “[L]iberalism  is  
also  a  fighting  creed.”105  What  distinguishes  Canada  from  France  then  
is  not  the  lack  of  a  national  ‘we.’  “Difference-­blind”  liberalism,  which  
claims to offer a neutral ground on which people of all cultures can 
meet, discuss, coexist, etc, in reality requires the separating out of the 
104  Big M, supra note 85 at 336.
105  Charles  Taylor,  “The  Politics  of  Recognition”  in  Amy  Gutman,  ed.  
Multiculturalism  (Princeton,  N.J.:  Princeton  University  Press,  1994)  at  62  [Taylor,  
“Politics”].
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public from the private, or religion from politics.106 He argues that lib-
eralism  “is  not  a  possible  meeting  ground  for  all  cultures,  but  is  the  po-
litical expression of one range of cultures, and quite incompatible with 
other ranges”.107 Not only does liberalism necessarily exclude cultures 
for which this separation is not possible, it has serious implications for 
judgment using the enlarged mentality. The solution that Taylor pro-
poses however, is compatible with the goals of Nedelsky’s theory: the 
challenge in dealing with an awkwardness stemming from substantial 
numbers of people who are citizens yet whose culture calls into ques-
tion   the   philosophical   boundaries   of   a   given   society   is   to   “deal  with  
their sense of marginalization without compromising our basic political 
principles.”108 Taylor emphasizes the need for recognition of the equal 
value of different cultures, of the acknowledgement of their worth. All 
cultures  in  a  multicultural  society  should  benefit  from  the  presumption  
that their culture has value even if the concluding judgment is not that 
the value is great.109 There is a parallel here to be drawn with Nedel-
sky’s theory, which explains that by actually listening to the content of 
religiously based argument, those making judgments will be in a better 
position to understand and take into account the sense of loss a reli-
gious community may feel when reforms are undertaken which involve 
deep social transformation that runs counter to the positions of those 
communities.110 In that sense, although Canada must not forget that its 
liberalism is never neutral, within it there appears to be potential to ac-
commodate what Nedelsky is calling for. France however, is in a differ-
ent position and as such is not able to accommodate what Nedelsky calls 
for.  The  difficulty  lies  in  that  participation  in  the  very  dialogue  on  the  
national ‘we’ is contingent on an individual or a community’s ability to 
dispense with its cultural identity thereby precluding the very possibil-
ity of recognition. 
Finally, whereas the Court in Canada has gone as far as elevating 
the principle of the protection of minorities to constitutional status, it 
appears that neither the constitutional documents, discourse nor insti-
106  Ibid.
107  Ibid.
108  Supra note 4 at 27.
109  Supra note 105 at 64.
110  Supra note 4 at 27.
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tutional structures in France are such that the same protection can be 
afforded to minorities there. As mentioned in the discussion on the con-
stitutional framework, there is no protection in France for minorities in 
the actual constitution, nor has any substantive protection been found 
implicitly. 
Furthermore, the dynamic between the courts and the legislature has 
shown that the result of disagreement and hostility between the two will 
be an assumption by the legislature of the task of redirecting state policy 
to conform with the ‘general will’. France’s parliamentary supremacy 
stands in sharp contrast to Canada’s system of government, which has 
been termed a constitutional supremacy.111 The implications for minori-
ties  are  significant.  The  Court  clearly  stated  in  Vriend112 that, while de-
mocracy  in  Canada  requires  that  “legislators  take  into  account  the  inter-
ests of majorities and minorities alike, all of whom will be affected by 
the decisions they make,” that judicial intervention will be required to 
correct a democratic process where the interests of minorities have been 
denied consideration. It is arguable that these aspects of French govern-
ance,  contrasted  with  their  Canadian  counterparts,  confirm  that  overall  
the institutional structures in France are too vulnerable to the will of ma-
jorities to facilitate the kind of judgment that Nedelsky is calling for. 
AFTERWORD
Although the purpose of this study is not to decide exactly if, how, where 
and when judgment using the enlarged mentality to include religious 
perspectives would be possible, it is worth taking a moment to consider 
what the implications are for Canada. It seems fair to conclude from the 
above analysis and discussion that, at the very least, the conditions in 
Canada do not totally preclude the possibility of taking religious per-
spectives. However, it is always important to bear in mind that the right 
conditions may not be everything. 
In June of 2004, former attorney general of Ontario Marion Boyd 
was asked by the government of Ontario to conduct a review of the use 
of religious arbitration in family law and its impact on vulnerable peo-
ple, particularly women. The review was a response to public concern 
111  Reference Re Secession, supra note 25 at 72.
112  Vriend v. Alberta [1998]  1  S.C.R.  493.
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about  the  potential  use  of  Muslim  personal  law  (Sharia)  in  the  wake  of  
a controversial proposal put forth by the Islamic Institute of Justice to 
establish  a  “Sharia  Court”  in  Ontario.  Despite  the  fact  that  family  mat-
ters have been arbitrated on the basis of religious teachings for many 
years, there was intense fear that allowing Sharia arbitration could lead 
to abuses and a consequent erosion of the equality rights of women. The 
public discourse was, unsurprisingly, plagued by numerous misconcep-
tions.113 
It is well beyond the scope and purpose of this paper to delve into 
the  issues  and  arguments  that  arose  as  a  result  of  this  process,  but  suffice  
to say that what resulted is interesting and pertinent given the present 
discussion. It is arguable that the process Marion Boyd engaged in 
throughout her study represents a form of the judgment using the en-
larged mentality that Nedelsky advocates for. The study involved very 
extensive consultations of all interested groups114 and a series of recom-
mendations was made based on those consultations. The recommenda-
tions included legislative and regulatory changes, changes to ensure ac-
cessibility to independent legal advice, public legal education programs, 
programs for the education, training and regulation of mediators and 
arbitrators and proposals for community development. 
She  concluded  that  the  guarantee  to  freedom  of  religion  in  s.  2(a)  
mandated that peoples’ choices be respected as long as the choices or 
results are not illegal.115 She wrote that
  [B]arring  Muslims,  or  any  other  identifiable  group  in  Ontario,  from  
arbitrating family law and inheritance matters, while others continue 
to arbitrate according to the principles of their choice…would raise 
the issue of whether the government was in violation of the Charter. 
Given that the Arbitration Act provides a framework for arbitration 
113     Marion  Boyd  “Dispute  Resolution  in  Family  Law:  Protecting  Choice,  Promoting  
Inclusion”  (2003)  at  4  online:  www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca  [Boyd  
Report].
114  Ibid. at appendix 2. Consultation involved speaking to over 50 groups and 
200 individuals including representatives from a variety of women’s organizations 
including immigrant organizations and groups dealing with domestic violence, 
representatives and organizations from the Muslim, Jewish and evangelical Christian 
communities, legal organizations and family lawyers, public legal education 
organizations, scholars, religious leaders, and private individuals.
115  Boyd Report, supra note 112 at 74.
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for all Ontarians, the government should not exclude a particular 
group of people on the basis of a prohibited ground.116
The   report,   entitled   “Dispute   Resolution   in   Family   Law:   Protecting  
Choice,   Promoting   Inclusion,”   was   submitted   to   the   government   of  
Ontario in December of 2004. Despite the commitment shown until 
that point to listen to the various interested individuals and parties and 
to meaningfully consider their perspectives, reality proved that what 
Nedelsky is calling for demands much of a given society and that a 
variety of challenges will inevitably arise. In September 2005, Ontario 
Premier  Dalton  McGuinty  told  the  Canadian  Press  that  he  had  “come  
to  the  conclusion  that  the  debate  has  gone  on  long  enough  […]  There  
will be no Sharia law in Ontario. There will be no religious arbitration 
in Ontario. There will be one law for all Ontarians.” Stating further that 
religious  arbitrations  “threaten  our  common  ground,”  he  promised  his  
government  would  introduce  legislation  “as  soon  as  possible”  to  outlaw  
them in Ontario.117 
It is likely that time will reveal the underlying reasons for this rath-
er sudden and thus far unexplained policy decision. In the meantime 
though, there may be important lessons to be learned. The experience 
reminds   us   of   both   the   very   real   limits   of   our   allegedly   “difference-­
blind” liberalism and that, occasionally, the ripeness of the conditions 
will mean very little if there is no will to actually follow through with 
the  perhaps  more  politically  difficult  choices  that  follow  from  them.      
116  Boyd Report, supra note 112 at 74.
117     Colin  Freeze  and  Karen  Howlett  “McGuinty  government  rules  out  use  of  sharia  
law”  The  Globe  and  Mail    (12  September  2005)  online:  The Globe and Mail <www.
theglobeandmail.com>.
